Valuation of Benchmark Provisions on IT Services Contracts by KAUFFMAN, Robert J. & SOUGSTAD, Ryan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
8-2012
Valuation of Benchmark Provisions on IT Services
Contracts
Robert J. KAUFFMAN
Singapore Management University, rkauffman@smu.edu.sg
Ryan SOUGSTAD
Augustana College
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/2346536.2346587
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Management Information Systems Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
KAUFFMAN, Robert J. and SOUGSTAD, Ryan. Valuation of Benchmark Provisions on IT Services Contracts. (2012). ICEC '12:
14th annual International Conference on Electronic Commerce, Singapore, 7-8 August, 2012: Proceedings. 270-271. Research Collection
School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1748
Valuation of Benchmark Provisions in IT Services Contracts 
Robert J. Kauffman  
Singapore Management University  
rkauffman@smu.edu.sg 
 
                                   Ryan Sougstad 
Augustana College 
rsougstad@augie.edu  
ABSTRACT 
Information technology (IT) services are often subject to down-
ward price pressures due to improvements in technology and 
business processes in a competitive market. When clients enter 
into IT services contracts, they are faced with the future risk that 
their services will be overpriced relative to the broader IT services 
market. To mitigate this risk, clients often add benchmark provi-
sions, whereby a neutral third party assesses the prevailing market 
price for services. It will support fair price adjustments if the mar-
ket prices are lower than the current prices. We model the deci-
sion to benchmark in order to provide managerial information on 
the value of benchmark provisions. We ground the model empiri-
cally with data from a leading IT service provider.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.3.3 [Programming Languages]: H.1.1 Systems and Infor-
mation Theory, Value of Information  
General Terms 
Algorithms, Management, Measurement, Performance, Design, 
Economics, Theory. 
Keywords 
Benchmarks, Contracts, Economics, IT Outsourcing, Risk Man-
agement 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As information technology (IT) services continue to evolve, pric-
ing remains a challenge. Both clients and providers seek the sta-
bility that long-term contracts offer. Unlike many goods and ser-
vices though, the prices for IT services tend to decline over time. 
Moore’s Law drives the prices of storage and computing power 
downward, and service providers also benefit from economies of 
scale and best practices, which also serve as downward price driv-
ers. Thus, a client firm may expect that, over time, the prices ne-
gotiated at the beginning of the contract are no longer competitive 
as compared to the marketplace. In order to mitigate the risk of 
over-paying for IT services, clients require that their contracts 
contain a benchmark clause. Benchmark clauses vary among cli-
ents and providers. A typical benchmark utilizes a third-party to 
conduct an analysis of the market price of IT services. Prices are 
then adjusted according to the terms of the contract.  
One of the ongoing concerns for client firms is when to include 
the benchmark clause in a contract, and how to exercise these 
clauses during the lifetime of the contract. Practitioners differ in  
 
their advice on the frequency and timing of exercising benchmark 
provisions, from consistent yearly intervals to the use of infre-
quent benchmarks after at least eighteen months in contracts with 
durations of longer than three years. We seek to provide actiona-
ble, managerial advice on the valuation of benchmark provisions.  
We draw on theory from financial economics and utilize dynamic 
programming and simulation methods. The exercise of a price 
benchmark in IT services contracts shares characteristics with the 
decision to refinance a home mortgage in the face of declining 
interest rates. Dunn and Spatt [2] and Agarwal et al. [1] provide 
theoretical models for the optimal time to refinance mortgages 
based on observed interest rates. The main difference in compari-
son to our scenario is that IT service prices are opaque, whereas 
mortgage holders observe the prevailing interest rates in the mar-
ketplace for home loans.  
A second perspective we draw on is options pricing theory and 
real options models for IT investment [4]. Our model utilizes a 
contingent expectations approach to modeling risk, which has 
been traditionally utilized by actuarial science [5]. This approach 
allows us to relax the assumption that IT services are traded, liq-
uid assets. This has been a criticism of real options models for IT 
investments.  
Our main research question is: What is the value of price bench-
marking provisions in IT services contracts from the point of view 
of client firms? We will examine four key variables and their 
effects on the value of benchmark provisions. They include: (1) 
the expected IT services price drift rate, which represents the 
expected decline in IT services prices over time; (2) the extent of 
IT services price volatility, which represents the uncertainty in the 
IT services price drift rate; (3) the estimated costs of carrying out 
the benchmark provisions; and (4) the number of benchmark pro-
visions for a given contract.  
Our computational finance model applied to IT services shows 
that, although the value of benchmarks increases with uncertainty 
in pricing, we can obtain robust findings except under conditions 
of extreme volatility. To illustrate, we will ground our model em-
pirically with data on network services price points over a five-
year time horizon. Furthermore, we will incorporate managerial 
estimates into the model, and highlight the boundary conditions to 
represent the inflection points for managerial decisions.  
2. MODEL 
We develop a continuous-time computational decision model that 
values benchmark provisions in terms of the discounted total con-
tract costs a client firm will face under different pricing strategies. 
In earlier work, we developed a closed-form solution for optimal 
benchmark exercise timing [3]. In contrast, our goal is to consider 
uncertainty and the number of benchmark provisions that can be 
considered. We offer this model as a basis for managerial decision 
support, and provided numerical solutions to illustrate the ap-
plicability of our modeling approach in the assessment context 
that we have specified.  
2.1. Model Setup 
We will consider a firm that is negotiating a long-term contract 
for networking services with a service provider. Table 1 provides 
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a summary of our modeling notation. We assume the firm has an 
estimate of the expected drift rate of IT services prices, μ, and the 
volatility of IT services price drift, σ. These estimates could be 
provided by historical data, as we utilize with our empirical ex-
ample, or by managerial estimates, similarly to those utilized in 
project management. Examples include PERT techniques. We 
further assume that the client and provider have negotiated an 
initial price P0, and duration T for the IT services. This is a con-
tinuous time representation of per period prices, such that the 
contract would have a total cost to the client of P0T. 
The main decision points for the client are whether to include a 
benchmark provision, and how many benchmarks, n, to include in 
the contract. The decision will then be weighed by the discounted 
value benchmark that the client will receive based on exercising 
the benchmark at an appropriate time t. A final parameter of the 
model is xn, the transaction costs of the benchmarks. A benchmark 
is costly to exercise, both in terms of fees and goodwill between 
the client and provider. Often providers contest benchmarks, and 
the process can even lead to court cases, such as the well-known 
example of IBM versus Cable and Wireless. A client firm must 
consider all of these tangible and intangible costs in setting a fig-
ure for the costs associated with exercising a benchmark and en-
forcing a price adjustment. 
2.2. Value of IT Service Price Benchmarks 
The benchmark provision provides the right, but not an obligation, 
to replace existing contract pricing with the prevailing market 
price determined by the third-party benchmark provider. We as-
sume, as is consistent with most benchmark provisions, that any 
increase in IT service prices would not trigger an increase in pric-
es for the client. Contracting helps the client firm in this respect. 
These two characteristics hold true in financial options also, 
where a holder has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise a 
call option in the event that the price of the security is higher than 
the strike price. By holding the option, rather than the underlying 
asset, the holder is indemnified against the risk of the underlying 
asset losing value. Losses are limited to the price of the option, 
much as losses are limited to the cost of exercising the benchmark 
in our IT services contracting setting.  
Thus, the total cost of a contract with a single benchmark provi-
sion C is represented by:   
   C = P0 t + Min [P t, P0] (T - t) - x1                                            (1) 
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation represents the 
contract costs up to the point of the benchmark. The second term 
represents the costs after the benchmark provision is exercised, 
with a price adjustment occurring only if P t > P0. 
Since the price at the time of exercise t is unknown, we can derive 
the expected price at the time of exercise as: 
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In order to derive the optimal time to benchmark we adopt the 
method used by Whaley [6] to derive conditional expectations of 
IT service prices. The conditional expectation if P t > P is  
E[P t | P t > P] = P0et ([d1]/[d2]), where d1 = [ln(P t et / P) + 
.52t] / t] and d2 = [ln(P t et / P)  - .5 2t]/t]. Φ is the cumula-
tive density function of the normal distribution.  Also, E[Pt | P t  
< P] = P tet ([-d1 ] /[-d2]). The probabilities of P t exceeding 
and falling below a threshold P are given by Pr[P t > P] = [d2] 
and  
Pr[P t < P] = [-d2].  
The objective function is then given by: 
  
MinC
t
= P0 t + min[E[Pt ], P0] T - t( )                                             (3) 
3. RESULTS 
Our model relies on a partial expectations approach to modeling 
the expected price at a future point in time. We have produced 
results for the single and multiple benchmark cases utilizing price 
data on network infrastructure services provided by a leading 
third-party benchmarking firm. Our data are intended to ground 
the model and provide reasonable estimates of the expected price 
decline and drift. We have 27 quarterly observations of estimated 
market prices for network services from 2005-2011. From these 
estimates, we calculated period-to-period growth of IT services. 
Our base model assumes that the expected price drift μ is normal-
ly- distributed. We conducted a goodness of fit test for normality 
and were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the data are 
normally distributed. The p-value was 0.976, so we feel comforta-
ble using the assumption of normality. We normalized the drift 
and volatility to set T = 1. Thus, a time frame of 5 years or 20 
quarters yielded a drift rate of μT = -0.572, and a voliatility σ√T = 
0.746. Here, σ is the standard deviation of IT services price drift. 
We modeled the multiple benchmark case utilizing a dynamic 
programming approach and a recursive algorithm involving nu-
merical inputs for price drift μ, the volatility of the price drift σ, 
and the transaction cost xn of the nth benchmark. We solved the 
model we specified by utilizing the combinatorial technique 
FINDMIN in Mathematica, which finds local minima within 
bounded constraints.  
We are currently pursuing further research to extend the related 
computational solution to value market price information availa-
ble to the firm prior to benchmarking. This will give managers the 
ability to avoid unnecessary losses in cases in which IT services 
prices do not decline. Another extension involves the considera-
tion of trigger points for the benchmark. The idea, for example, is 
that price adjustments may only need to occur if the market prices 
are 25% or more below the current prices paid by the clients. It is 
our hope that these models can be further developed and built into 
decision support systems. Further empirical work will need to be 
done to validate the estimations of our model’s parameters 
though. 
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